1 Signature scheme 0/10, weighted 30%
Band 0: Classical signatures only on mainnet, with nothing post-quantum protecting live funds. Short-lived devnets and one-off benchmarks sit here: they demonstrate research rather than something a user can hold keys on.
WEMIX transactions are validated through go-ethereum's signer, which recovers an ECDSA secp256k1 sender, and fee-delegated transactions add a second secp256k1 signature from the fee payer. Block producers sign headers with secp256k1 node keys. Nothing post-quantum protects WEMIX or any asset on the chain today.
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2 Deployment stage 1/10, weighted 25%
Band 1: Tier 5: Exposed.
Tier 5: Exposed. The signatures that authorise spends and seal blocks are quantum-vulnerable, and no post-quantum roadmap, improvement proposal or research programme was found from the WEMIX Foundation, in WEMIX's documentation or in the go-wemix repository.
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3 NIST alignment 0/10, weighted 15%
Band 0 to 2: No post-quantum scheme named for the chain’s fund-protecting signatures, or a proprietary scheme with no public cryptanalysis.
No post-quantum scheme has been named for WEMIX's account or block producer signatures. Neither the WEMIX3.0 documentation nor the go-wemix code mentions one.
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Placement in the band The floor of the band rather than a 1 or a 2: no one with authority over WEMIX has named a post-quantum scheme for its signatures, so there is nothing to place against a standard.
4 Migration path 2/10, weighted 15%
Band 0 to 2: No agreed migration path, or the proposals on the table would strand or freeze holder funds.
WEMIX has coordinated network upgrades through hard forks, Applepie at block 20,476,911 on 14 June 2023 and Brioche at block 53,525,500 on 1 July 2024 Korean time, so a change of signature scheme could be delivered the same way. There is no mechanism for replacing an account's key in place: an address is a hash of its key, and moving to a new key means moving the funds. Nothing on post-quantum migration has been proposed.
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Placement in the band The top of the band rather than a 0 or a 1: the record of coordinated hard forks under a 40-member governance shows a change could be delivered. Not a 3, because no key rotation or account abstraction mechanism exists and the problem has not been acknowledged.
5 Exposure 2/10, weighted 10%
Band 0 to 2: Public keys are exposed for effectively all accounts, or a large, measured share of total supply sits in exposed addresses.
WEMIX uses Ethereum's account model, in which an address is a hash of the public key, so a funded account that has never sent a transaction keeps its key private. Any account that has signed has published its key, and because WEMIX accounts use the same keys and addresses as Ethereum, a key that has signed on any EVM chain is exposed on WEMIX too.
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Placement in the band The top of the band rather than a 1: the hashed-address model protects never-signed accounts. Not a 3, because almost all economically active WEMIX sits behind a key that has signed, and no measurement of the unexposed share has been published.
6 Verification 2/10, weighted 5%
Band 0 to 2: No post-quantum component exists, or the claims rest on marketing.
No post-quantum component exists for WEMIX's signatures: no code, specification or testnet implementation was found. go-wemix is open source, but under v1.8 the openness of classical code earns nothing here.
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Placement in the band The top of the band rather than a 0 or a 1: there is no post-quantum component to verify, but nothing about WEMIX is marketed as quantum-safe, so its position does not rest on marketing.