1 Signature scheme 0/10, weighted 30%
Band 0: Classical signatures only on mainnet, with nothing post-quantum protecting live funds. Short-lived devnets and one-off benchmarks sit here: they demonstrate research rather than something a user can hold keys on.
Injective's signature-verification gas consumer recognises eth_secp256k1, secp256k1, Ed25519 and multisig keys and rejects any other type, all of them classical, and its mainnet consensus parameters allow Ed25519 validator keys and nothing else. Nothing post-quantum protects INJ or any asset on Injective.
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2 Deployment stage 1/10, weighted 25%
Band 1: Tier 5: Exposed.
Tier 5: Exposed. The signatures protecting funds and finalising blocks are quantum-vulnerable, and Injective's published position is a series of social posts saying quantum-resistant infrastructure is in development, which is neither a formal improvement proposal nor a public research programme. See the caveat on why this is a judgement call.
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3 NIST alignment 0/10, weighted 15%
Band 0 to 2: No post-quantum scheme named for the chain’s fund-protecting signatures, or a proprietary scheme with no public cryptanalysis.
Injective has not named a post-quantum scheme for its account or validator signatures, as a selection or as an example, so there is nothing to assess against a NIST standard.
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Placement in the band The floor of the band rather than a 1 or a 2: the posts promise quantum resistance without saying what it would be built on, so there is no named scheme, even a candidate, to align with a standard.
4 Migration path 2/10, weighted 15%
Band 0 to 2: No agreed migration path, or the proposals on the table would strand or freeze holder funds.
No migration plan exists. Injective changes its chain through governance-approved software upgrades, and the Cosmos SDK it forks now ships ML-DSA-65 keys for accounts and validators in v0.55, a mechanism Injective could adopt. Mainnet runs a fork of Cosmos SDK v0.50, and nothing Injective has said addresses how holders would move to post-quantum keys.
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Placement in the band The top of the band rather than a 1: Injective has acknowledged the quantum problem in public, and a working post-quantum key type exists upstream in the framework it runs on. Not a 3, because the acknowledgement is a promise of infrastructure, not a recognition of the migration problem, and no mechanism for Injective holders has been described.
5 Exposure 2/10, weighted 10%
Band 0 to 2: Public keys are exposed for effectively all accounts, or a large, measured share of total supply sits in exposed addresses.
An Injective address is derived as on Ethereum, from the Keccak hash of the eth_secp256k1 public key, so an account that has never signed keeps its key private. Every account that has transacted or staked has published its key, and a key that has signed on any EVM chain exposes the same address on Injective. Validator consensus keys are public by design.
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Placement in the band The top of the band rather than a 1: never-signed addresses keep their keys hidden. Not a 3, because staking INJ needs a signed delegation, so almost all actively held INJ sits behind a revealed key, and no measurement of the unexposed share has been published.
6 Verification 2/10, weighted 5%
Band 0 to 2: No post-quantum component exists, or the claims rest on marketing.
No post-quantum component exists to verify: no code, specification, proposal or testnet was found, and the posts saying development is in progress link to none. Injective's node source has also been private since 9 September 2026, so any future component could not be checked from the public repository as it stands.
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Placement in the band The top of the band rather than a 0 or a 1: there is nothing to verify, but Injective does not claim to be quantum-safe today; its posts describe quantum resistance as coming, not as delivered.