1 Signature scheme 0/10, weighted 30%
Band 0: Classical signatures only on mainnet, with nothing post-quantum protecting live funds. Short-lived devnets and one-off benchmarks sit here: they demonstrate research rather than something a user can hold keys on.
Kite executes transactions with a fork of Subnet-EVM, which takes its transaction types and sender recovery from Ava Labs' libevm, the go-ethereum code that recovers an ECDSA secp256k1 signer. Kite's validators are registered on the P-Chain with BLS12-381 keys. Nothing post-quantum protects KITE or any asset on Kite today.
source
2 Deployment stage 1/10, weighted 25%
Band 1: Tier 5: Exposed.
Tier 5: Exposed. The signatures protecting funds and the validator keys on Kite are quantum-vulnerable, and no Kite proposal, roadmap, publication or research programme on post-quantum signatures was found in its documentation or its public repositories.
source
3 NIST alignment 0/10, weighted 15%
Band 0 to 2: No post-quantum scheme named for the chain’s fund-protecting signatures, or a proprietary scheme with no public cryptanalysis.
No post-quantum scheme has been named for Kite's account or validator signatures, so there is nothing to assess against a NIST standard.
source
Placement in the band The floor of the band rather than a 1 or a 2: no scheme has been named at all, even as an example, by anyone with authority over Kite, so there is no choice to align with a standard.
4 Migration path 2/10, weighted 15%
Band 0 to 2: No agreed migration path, or the proposals on the table would strand or freeze holder funds.
No migration plan or published position exists. Kite does have working upgrade machinery: its chain configuration, read from the mainnet RPC with eth_getChainConfig, shows Avalanche's Helicon network upgrade activated on 22 September 2026, after the public launch, and Subnet-EVM can activate new precompiles at a scheduled timestamp, which is the route a post-quantum verifier would take. Smart-contract wallets from the account-abstraction SDK are still controlled by an ECDSA signer.
source
Placement in the band The top of the band rather than a 0 or a 1: Kite has carried a coordinated network upgrade on its live mainnet, and the precompile-upgrade mechanism in the client it runs gives it a path to add a new signature check without a new chain. Not a 3, because Kite has not acknowledged the quantum problem in public, let alone described a route for holders.
5 Exposure 2/10, weighted 10%
Band 0 to 2: Public keys are exposed for effectively all accounts, or a large, measured share of total supply sits in exposed addresses.
Kite keeps Ethereum's account model: an address is a hash of the public key, so an account that has never signed keeps its key private. Every account that has sent a transaction has published its key, and because Kite accepts the same keys and addresses as Ethereum, a key published on any EVM chain exposes the same address on Kite. Validator BLS keys are public on the P-Chain by design.
source
Placement in the band The top of the band rather than a 1: never-signed addresses keep their keys hidden. Not a 3, because almost all economically active KITE sits behind a key that has signed, on Kite or on another EVM chain, and no measurement of the unexposed share has been published.
6 Verification 2/10, weighted 5%
Band 0 to 2: No post-quantum component exists, or the claims rest on marketing.
No post-quantum component exists for Kite: no code, specification or testnet implementation was found in its forks of AvalancheGo and Subnet-EVM or in its documentation. The node code is open source, but under v1.8 the openness of classical code earns nothing on this dimension.
source
Placement in the band The top of the band rather than a 0 or a 1: there is nothing post-quantum to verify, but Kite does not market the chain as quantum-safe. The one mention of quantum computers in its documentation, that they "cannot resurrect expired sessions", is about session expiry, not about the signatures protecting funds.