1 Signature scheme 2/10, weighted 30%
Band 1 to 3: Classical signatures only on mainnet, with a post-quantum implementation live and usable by the public on a persistent test network.
Tron mainnet signs with ECDSA on secp256k1 and nothing post-quantum protects TRX or TRC-20 balances. Falcon-512 is live on the public Nile testnet, where the chain parameter getAllowFnDsa512 reads 1, while that parameter is absent from mainnet entirely.
source
Placement in the band Not a 3: only one of the two schemes TIP-899 specifies is actually usable. ML-DSA-44 is staged on Nile at 0 and has never been activated, so the testnet implementation is half-delivered against its own specification.
2 Deployment stage 2/10, weighted 25%
Band 2: Tier 4: Debating.
Tier 4: Debating. TIP-899 is a formal proposal in Tron's own improvement process, authored from tron.network, and Falcon-512 is running on a persistent public testnet, which clears the Debating floor comfortably. It is not Tier 3 because the proposal is Draft, no scheme is agreed for mainnet and no timeline is published.
source
3 NIST alignment 7/10, weighted 15%
Band 6 to 8: The scheme is NIST-selected but the standard is not yet final, or a NIST-approved scheme is named but not yet deployed.
TIP-899 names two specific parameter sets rather than a direction: ML-DSA-44 from the finalised FIPS 204, and FN-DSA-512 from the FIPS 206 draft. Specifying standardised parameter sets down to their canonical wire encodings is a committed selection, not a candidate reference.
source
Placement in the band Not a 9: the scheme Tron actually switched on, Falcon-512, rests on FIPS 206, which NIST has not finalised. A 9 would need the deployed choice to sit under a final standard.
4 Migration path 5/10, weighted 15%
Band 3 to 5: Migration is acknowledged as a problem with no agreed mechanism, or the mechanism is contested.
TIP-899 lets a single account carry a mix of ECDSA and post-quantum signers under Tron's existing permission weights, which is a genuine route off a vulnerable key for a holder who acts.
source
Placement in the band Not a 6: a mechanism is not a plan. The 6 to 8 band asks for a published migration plan, and TIP-899 proposes no sunset for ECDSA, attaches no dates, and says nothing about accounts whose keys are already public.
5 Exposure 2/10, weighted 10%
Band 0 to 2: Public keys are exposed for effectively all accounts, or a large, measured share of total supply sits in exposed addresses.
Tron addresses are derived from a hash of the public key, so a funded account that has never sent a transaction keeps its key private. Given Tron's transaction volumes, effectively all economically meaningful accounts have transacted and published their keys.
source
Placement in the band Not a 3: the hashed-address protection is real, but it only covers accounts that have never signed, and on a network built for high-frequency stablecoin transfers those hold a negligible share of value.
6 Verification 7/10, weighted 5%
Band 6 to 8: Open source with public review or a named third-party audit of the relevant component.
The specification is public and has been under open discussion in the TIP repository since June 2026, java-tron is open source, and the Nile activation is checkable on-chain by anyone who queries the chain parameters.
source
Placement in the band Not an 8: no third-party audit of Tron's post-quantum implementation was found. Open code and an open specification are public review, which the band credits, but they are not the named audit the top of it asks for.