1 Signature scheme 0/10, weighted 30%
Band 0: Classical signatures only on mainnet, with nothing post-quantum protecting live funds. Short-lived devnets and one-off benchmarks sit here: they demonstrate research rather than something a user can hold keys on.
Monad recovers transaction senders with ECDSA on secp256k1, and nothing post-quantum protects MON on mainnet. The P-256 precompile lets smart accounts verify passkeys, but P-256 is also an elliptic curve broken by Shor's algorithm, and no post-quantum scheme runs on any Monad network.
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2 Deployment stage 2/10, weighted 25%
Band 2: Tier 4: Debating.
Tier 4: Debating. The account-authentication design is a formal Draft proposal by Category Labs researchers in Monad's improvement-proposal forum, and the Monad Foundation's roadmap sets out a public post-quantum programme. It is not Tier 3 because the roadmap names no post-quantum scheme and no funded programme to select one, and the proposal that does name ML-DSA is a Draft.
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3 NIST alignment 4/10, weighted 15%
Band 3 to 5: NIST schemes are referenced as candidates without a committed selection, or the work is bespoke research.
The Draft authentication proposal lists ML-DSA, from the final FIPS 204, among its initial scheme identifiers. It names no parameter set, and the Monad Foundation's roadmap names no scheme at all for accounts or validators.
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Placement in the band A 4 rather than a 5: ML-DSA appears as one entry in a list of schemes the design could carry, with no parameter set and the concrete specification deferred, so it is a reference, not a selection. Not a 3, because the scheme named for Monad's own accounts is a final NIST standard.
4 Migration path 4/10, weighted 15%
Band 3 to 5: Migration is acknowledged as a problem with no agreed mechanism, or the mechanism is contested.
The Draft proposal would let a holder keep an address and change what authorises it: add a post-quantum authenticator, then retire the ECDSA key, through a precompile with a delay before changes take effect. Existing accounts would keep working as single-key ECDSA accounts until they upgrade.
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Placement in the band Not a 5: the proposal is a version-one architecture with its implementation specification deferred, nothing runs on any network, and neither it nor the roadmap says what happens to accounts that never upgrade. Not a 3, because a specific in-place mechanism has been designed for the chain's own accounts.
5 Exposure 2/10, weighted 10%
Band 0 to 2: Public keys are exposed for effectively all accounts, or a large, measured share of total supply sits in exposed addresses.
A Monad address is the Keccak hash of the public key, as on Ethereum, so an account that has never signed keeps its key private. Accounts in use have signed and published their keys, and because Monad uses Ethereum's key and address format, a key published on any EVM chain exposes the same address on Monad.
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Placement in the band At the top of the band rather than a 0 or a 1: never-signed accounts are genuinely protected by the hashed address, though key reuse across EVM chains means an address can be exposed on Monad without having signed there.
6 Verification 2/10, weighted 5%
Band 0 to 2: No post-quantum component exists, or the claims rest on marketing.
No post-quantum component exists to verify. The authentication design is a forum Draft with no implementation, and no post-quantum code was found in Category Labs' public repositories. The forum thread has drawn outside comment on the design, but under v1.8 review of a proposal is not review of a component.
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Placement in the band The top of the band rather than a 0 or a 1: there is nothing to verify, but Monad does not market itself as quantum-safe, and its roadmap says plainly that users would have to migrate to gain protection.