1 Signature scheme 0/10, weighted 30%
Band 0: Classical signatures only on mainnet, with nothing post-quantum protecting live funds. Short-lived devnets and one-off benchmarks sit here: they demonstrate research rather than something a user can hold keys on.
Sonic transactions are validated through go-ethereum's types.Sender, which recovers an ECDSA secp256k1 signer, and the node defines a single validator public key type, Secp256k1. Nothing post-quantum protects S or any asset on Sonic today.
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2 Deployment stage 1/10, weighted 25%
Band 1: Tier 5: Exposed.
Tier 5: Exposed. The signatures securing Sonic are quantum-vulnerable, and the published position is a Sonic Labs blog post describing how a swap would work, which is neither a formal improvement proposal nor a public research programme. See the caveat below on why this is a judgement call.
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3 NIST alignment 3/10, weighted 15%
Band 3 to 5: NIST schemes are referenced as candidates without a committed selection, or the work is bespoke research.
Sonic Labs names NIST schemes as examples and no more: the migration would swap in "a NIST-standardized scheme such as Dilithium or Falcon". Dilithium is standardised as ML-DSA in FIPS 204 and Falcon is on track as FN-DSA, but no scheme or parameter set has been selected.
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Placement in the band The floor of the band rather than a 4 or a 5: the schemes appear as examples in a blog post, not as candidates in a proposal or a test, and no parameter set is mentioned. Above a 2, because the schemes named are NIST's own and are named for Sonic's own transaction and event signatures.
4 Migration path 3/10, weighted 15%
Band 3 to 5: Migration is acknowledged as a problem with no agreed mechanism, or the mechanism is contested.
Sonic Labs acknowledges the problem and sketches the protocol side of a change: replace the per-event and transaction signatures and update the hash output size. Nothing is said about how existing holders would move their funds to post-quantum keys, and no mechanism, proposal or date exists.
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Placement in the band The floor of the band rather than a 4 or a 5: the acknowledgement comes from the core team and describes a protocol swap, but the hard part of migration, moving existing accounts whose keys are already public, is not addressed at all.
5 Exposure 2/10, weighted 10%
Band 0 to 2: Public keys are exposed for effectively all accounts, or a large, measured share of total supply sits in exposed addresses.
Sonic uses Ethereum's account model, in which an address is a hash of the public key, so a funded account that has never sent a transaction keeps its key private. Any account that has signed has published its key, which in practice covers almost all economically active supply.
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Placement in the band The top of the band rather than a 1: the hashed-address model protects never-signed accounts. Not a 3, because almost no active supply still has that protection, and keys carried over from Fantom Opera may already be public on that chain, which nobody has measured.
6 Verification 2/10, weighted 5%
Band 0 to 2: No post-quantum component exists, or the claims rest on marketing.
No post-quantum component exists for Sonic: no code, specification or testnet implementation was found. The node is open source, but under v1.8 the openness of the classical code earns nothing here, because what this dimension verifies is the post-quantum component that protects funds.
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Placement in the band The top of the band rather than a 0 or a 1: there is no post-quantum component to verify, but Sonic Labs does not market the chain as quantum-safe today, so its position does not rest on marketing.