Hardy Index Quantum readiness, rated and tracked

About

About the Hardy Index

The Hardy Index is an independent readiness benchmark. It scores how prepared each major blockchain is for the quantum-computing threat, and nothing else.

Why this exists

In March 2026 a Google Quantum AI paper cut the estimated resources needed to break the elliptic-curve cryptography behind most blockchains by roughly a factor of twenty. Since then "which blockchain is quantum-safe?" has stopped being a specialist question. The answers circulating are mostly listicles and project marketing, and several of them are simply out of date. IOTA, for example, is still widely described as quantum-resistant on the strength of a signature scheme it removed in 2021.

A question that people are asking daily deserves a neutral referee: one place that rates every chain against the same published rubric, sources every claim, and says plainly when it is making a judgement call.

Ownership and funding

The Hardy Index is owned, operated and funded by Delancy AI Limited, registered in England and Wales (company number 16917509), with its registered office at 128 City Road, London, EC1V 2NX, United Kingdom. Hardy has no sponsors or advertisers, and no chain, foundation or issuer pays for coverage or a rating.

Delancy AI is a technology consultancy that takes paid client work. If a rated chain ever becomes a client, we will say so here and on that chain's profile.

Neutrality statement

These are commitments, not aspirations. If we break one, we have failed at the only job.

  • We rate; we do not recommend. Nothing on this site is investment advice, and no page tells you what to buy, sell or hold. A high Hardy Score is a statement about cryptography, not about an asset.
  • No chain can pay for a rating, a review or a position. There is no paid placement, no sponsored profile and no expedited review. The methodology applies identically to every chain in the index.
  • We hold no position that a rating could move. The index is not run to benefit a token, a fund or a protocol.
  • The rubric is public before the scores are. You can check our arithmetic against our own published anchors on the methodology page.
  • Corrections are logged in public. Every score change, methodology change and mistake appears in the changelog with a reason and a source.

How we work

Each chain is assessed against primary sources: the chain's own documentation and roadmaps, standards published by NIST, public code repositories and improvement proposals, and named research papers. Where we use a secondary source, usually an exposure estimate produced by a third-party analytics firm, it is labelled as secondary in the source list on that chain's profile.

Scores are set editorially in this phase, which means a person decides them. Research and drafting use AI tools, and the editor reviews and approves every rating change and correction before it is published. That is a limitation and we would rather state it than obscure it. The rubric, anchors and derived deployment mapping exist to constrain that judgement as tightly as possible, and the build refuses to publish a dataset whose tiers and scores contradict each other.

What stands in for a review committee here is a set of checks that a judgement has to survive before it reaches the site, and they are worth naming because you can verify each one rather than take our word for it. Every score carries a note and a primary source link, and the build rejects a score without them. A tier and its deployment score are the same claim, so the build fails if an editor moves one without the other. Where a published anchor covers more than one score, the data has to state why that exact value and not its neighbour. Every change is logged in the changelog with a reason, a source and the score either side of it, so a revision cannot be made quietly. None of that is the same as a second reader, and we are not going to claim it is. It does mean the specific ways a single editor's judgement could drift are the ones a machine is checking.

What is in scope

The index rates layer-1 blockchains: networks that run their own consensus and whose own signature scheme secures the balances people hold. That boundary is not arbitrary. The question this index answers is whether the cryptography protecting your funds can be forged by a quantum computer, and that question only has a clean answer where a network controls its own signatures.

Four categories are excluded, each for a specific reason.

  • Layer 2s and rollups. A rollup inherits settlement security from the chain beneath it, so its quantum exposure is partly its own and partly its parent's. Rating it on the same scale as a layer 1 would compare two different things. This excludes Starknet, which is an Ethereum layer 2, despite it having genuinely interesting post-quantum work: its STARK proof system is hash-based and therefore not vulnerable to Shor's algorithm, while its account keys use a Stark-curve signature that is. That distinction deserves a profile, but not on this scale.
  • Oracles and middleware. These secure data feeds or route messages between chains. They do not hold a ledger of balances under their own signature scheme, so the dimensions in our rubric do not apply. This excludes Chainlink, and it also excludes Quant: Overledger is an interoperability layer rather than a blockchain, and QNT is an ERC-20 token on Ethereum, so its holders carry Ethereum's exposure rather than any of its own.
  • Stablecoins and tokens. A token inherits the signature scheme of whatever chain it lives on. Rating it separately would double-count the host chain and imply the token has a cryptographic position of its own, which it does not.
  • Polkadot parachains. A parachain's own signature scheme secures the balances on it, but its blocks are validated and finalised by Polkadot's relay chain validators rather than by a consensus of its own. Its quantum exposure is therefore partly its own and partly Polkadot's, the same split that keeps rollups out, and Polkadot is rated here in its own right. This excludes chains such as Astar, Hydration and peaq.

Which chains we cover

Within that boundary, a chain is in scope if it meets any one of three tests.

  1. Scale. It is one of the seventy-five largest layer 1s by market capitalisation. Market value is not part of the Hardy Score and never will be, for the reasons set out on the methodology page. It is used here and only here: size decides who gets assessed, never how they score.
  2. Position. It has published a post-quantum position of any kind, at any size: a claim to be quantum-safe, or a roadmap, an improvement proposal or a funded research programme addressing the threat. Testing those against what is actually deployed is a large part of what this index is for, including where we find a claim does not hold.
  3. Deployment. It has a post-quantum signature scheme running on mainnet, at any size. A small chain that has actually shipped is one of the most informative rows in the index, and is exactly what a ranking by market value would hide.

Two conditions apply to all three. The chain must have a live public mainnet, because the bottom of the readiness spine describes the signatures securing real balances and a network without a mainnet has none. And the deployed scheme must be confirmable against a primary source, or the row is held back rather than guessed at.

The scale test is re-checked on the first of each month against that day's market capitalisations, so the list does not churn with daily price moves. Any new entrant that passes is added. A chain admitted on scale stays in once admitted, and is removed only if it falls outside the hundred largest layer 1s and meets neither of the other two tests.

A chain that meets none of the three tests is not missing because we judged it unimportant. It is absent because nothing about its quantum position is yet in question. If you believe a chain qualifies and is not here, that is a coverage gap and we would like to know about it.

Chains we have held back

A chain is only published once its signature scheme and its post-quantum status can be confirmed against a primary source. Where a project markets post-quantum protection but we cannot verify what is actually deployed, we hold the row rather than guess in either direction. Publishing an unverified high score would be as damaging as publishing an unfair low one.

  • Cellframe. Its documentation lists post-quantum algorithms as available, and its own material describes a post-quantum transaction on mainnet, but we could not confirm from primary documentation which scheme secures ordinary transactions by default or whether post-quantum signing is mandatory.
  • QANplatform. It markets a quantum-resistant layer 1 built on CRYSTALS-Dilithium, and its components carry real third-party audits, but there is no public mainnet. That means no deployed scheme to inspect and no live balances to assess. It was rated until 12 August 2026, when the bottom of the readiness spine became Exposed, a rung that describes the signatures securing funds on a live mainnet. A chain with no mainnet has no such signatures, so the row is held back until one is running.
  • Quranium. Its mainnet is described as live and natively post-quantum using SPHINCS+, but the developer documentation was not reachable to us at the time of writing, so the claim rests on announcements rather than a specification we could inspect.
  • Canton Network. It qualifies on scale. Secondary sources report that Canton signs with Ed25519 by default and supports ECDSA over P-256 and P-384, which would be an ordinary quantum-vulnerable position, but every version of the security documentation stating those schemes served us a navigation shell rather than the text. We will not publish a signature assessment from a search-engine summary of a page we could not read, so the row waits for a specification we can quote.
  • Pi Network. It qualifies on scale, but its node software is not public and no Pi specification names the signature scheme. Its official developer SDK uses Stellar-style Ed25519 keys, which suggests the answer, but an SDK is not the chain, so the row waits.
  • Stable. It qualifies on scale. Its documentation describes accounts as standard Ethereum accounts, which would mean ECDSA over secp256k1, but it never names the scheme, and the node source is not public.
  • Plasma. It qualifies on scale. Its documentation says it uses the same transaction types as Ethereum without naming the signature scheme, and we could not find public node source to confirm it.
  • Onyxcoin. It qualifies on scale, and its own documentation describes a layer 1 rather than the rollup it began as. That documentation refers to ECDSA keys without naming the curve, and no node source for the new network is public.
  • Ultima. It qualifies on scale, but we found no specification, documentation or source code for the chain at all, only exchange listings.
  • Pearl. Unlike the others, its scheme is confirmed: it qualifies on deployment, with an XMSS post-quantum spend path live on its mainnet since genesis. It is held back because no rung fits until holders can use that path. The wallet address Pearl offers keeps a classical key path, and no released Pearl software signs an XMSS spend; the code that does is an open pull request. A holder has to be able to install a release to use it, so the row waits for that code to ship. We are watching the pull request and Pearl's releases.
  • Arc. Circle's layer 1 qualifies on deployment: a precompile that verifies SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s signatures has been live on its mainnet since launch, while accounts sign with ECDSA over secp256k1 and validators with Ed25519. Like Pearl, it is held back because no rung fits until a holder can put coins behind that scheme with released software. Circle lists native post-quantum wallet signing as in progress, and the only contracts using the precompile are unaudited and ship no release a holder can install. We are watching Circle's post-quantum roadmap page.

The others will be added as soon as the deployed scheme can be verified, Pearl when its post-quantum wallet code ships in a release, and Arc when native post-quantum signing ships or a released wallet or tool reaches the precompile. If you can point us at the primary documentation, that is the fastest route.

Assessed and out of scope

A chain we assessed and found to meet none of the three tests. It is not held back for want of evidence; the evidence says it does not qualify today.

  • Qubic. Assessed on 22 October 2026 and found out of scope on 23 October. It ranks outside the seventy-five largest layer 1s, so its only route in was the position test, which needs the chain's own published position. Qubic has none: its own article on quantum threats says its documentation makes no post-quantum claim, and the quantum-resistant label it carries comes from market aggregators and a third-party article. It signs with SchnorrQ on the FourQ curve, which Shor's algorithm breaks. Our assessment is kept, and the row returns if Qubic publishes a position or enters the seventy-five.

Corrections and contact

If a score is wrong, the most useful thing you can send is the primary source that contradicts it. Write to index@hardyindex.com. Corrections are published in the changelog with the source that prompted them, including corrections to our own errors.

Chains are welcome to submit sources and will be assessed on the same rubric as everyone else. Submitting a source does not create an obligation to change a score.

Citing and reusing the index

The index is meant to be cited. Every page has a Markdown mirror at the same URL with a .md extension, and the site publishes an llms.txt for machine readers. When quoting a score, please include the Hardy Score, the tier and the "as of" date, because all three move.

Current methodology version: v1.8.

This is a security-readiness assessment, not investment advice.