1 Signature scheme 0/10, weighted 30%
Band 0: Classical signatures only on mainnet, with nothing post-quantum protecting live funds. Short-lived devnets and one-off benchmarks sit here: they demonstrate research rather than something a user can hold keys on.
KCC recovers every transaction sender with ECDSA on secp256k1 through the go-ethereum signer it inherits, and its PoSA engine recovers each block's sealer with the same curve. A transfer read from the public RPC on 23 October 2026 carried an EIP-155 signature for chain 321. Nothing post-quantum protects KCS or any asset on KCC.
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2 Deployment stage 1/10, weighted 25%
Band 1: Tier 5: Exposed.
Tier 5: Exposed. The signatures protecting funds and sealing blocks are quantum-vulnerable, and no KIP, documentation page, node release or research programme on post-quantum signatures for KCC was found. KuCoin's post-quantum gateway proof of concept covers connections to the exchange, not KCC's signatures, and does not mention the chain.
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3 NIST alignment 0/10, weighted 15%
Band 0 to 2: No post-quantum scheme named for the chain’s fund-protecting signatures, or a proprietary scheme with no public cryptanalysis.
No post-quantum scheme has been named for KCC's account or validator signatures, so there is nothing to assess against a NIST standard.
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Placement in the band The floor of the band rather than a 1 or a 2: nobody with authority over KCC has named a scheme at all, even as an example. KuCoin's gateway post names Dilithium for the exchange's own connections, and crediting it would score an exchange product rather than the chain.
4 Migration path 2/10, weighted 15%
Band 0 to 2: No agreed migration path, or the proposals on the table would strand or freeze holder funds.
No migration plan or published position exists. KCC does have a working route for protocol change: its client has carried a coordinated fix for CVE-2021-39137 at block 2,509,228 in August 2021, the Ishikari hard fork in June 2022, which replaced the validator system contracts, and the Amazon hard fork at block 24,766,075 in October 2023. Its documentation lists ERC-4337 wallet support as a KCC 2.0 aim, but says the chain is still in KCC 1.0, so no account-abstraction route exists today.
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Placement in the band The top of the band rather than a 0 or a 1: the chain has a record of coordinated hard forks shipped through its own client. Not a 3, because nobody with authority over KCC has acknowledged the quantum problem in public, let alone described a route for holders.
5 Exposure 2/10, weighted 10%
Band 0 to 2: Public keys are exposed for effectively all accounts, or a large, measured share of total supply sits in exposed addresses.
KCC keeps Ethereum's account model: an address is a hash of the public key, so an account that has never signed keeps its key private. Every account that has sent a transaction has published its key, and because KCC accepts the same keys and addresses as Ethereum, a key published on any EVM chain exposes the same address here. Validator signer addresses are recovered from every block seal.
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Placement in the band The top of the band rather than a 1: never-signed addresses keep their keys hidden. Not a 3, because almost all economically active KCS sits behind a key that has signed, here or on another EVM chain, and no measurement of the unexposed share has been published.
6 Verification 2/10, weighted 5%
Band 0 to 2: No post-quantum component exists, or the claims rest on marketing.
No post-quantum component exists for KCC: no code, specification or testnet implementation was found in the node repository, the KIPs repository or the documentation. The node is open source, but under v1.8 the openness of classical code earns nothing on this dimension.
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Placement in the band The top of the band rather than a 0 or a 1: there is nothing post-quantum to verify, but nothing about KCC is marketed as quantum-safe, so its position does not rest on marketing.